OHOMA v. OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF AGUINALDO, IFUGAO G.R. No. 239584

OHOMA v. OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF AGUINALDO, IFUGAO G.R. No. 239584 June 17, 2019

Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. (n)

FACTS:

Matron M. Ohoma filed a petition for cancellation of his Certificate of Live Birth before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. Ohoma averred that his birth was belatedly recorded on February 8, 2000 with the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Aguinaldo, but unknown to him, his birth had already been previously registered on June 13, 1986, also with the LCR of Aguinaldo. It is this first Certificate of Live Birth that he seeks to cancel because, according to Ohoma, it contains the following erroneous entries: (1) His first name is recorded as “Matron” instead of “Matiorico”, and (2) His last name is recorded as “Ohoma”, instead of “Ohomna.” He further averred that he has been using the name “Matiorico Ohomna”, and has been known by such name both in his public and private transactions, thus, it is his second birth certificate that correctly reflects these entries. The RTC granted Ohoma’s petition, and ordered the LCR of Aguinaldo to cancel Ohoma’s first birth certificate, as the same contains errors that caused confusion as to the identity of Ohoma. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the appeal, and annulled and set aside the RTC Decision, holding that there can be no valid late registration of Ohoma’s birth, considering that the same had already been lawfully registered with the LCR of Aguinaldo within 30 days from the time of his birth, thus, the RTC should have cancelled his second birth certificate, not the first one. It further held that Ohoma’s proper remedy was to file a petition for correction of entries in his first birth certificate pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aggrieved, Ohoma filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it annulled and set aside the RTC Decision ordering the cancellation of Ohoma’s first birth certificate

RULING:

No, the CA did not reversible error when it annulled and set aside the RTC Decision ordering the cancellation of Ohoma’s first birth certificate. While there is no need to re-file a petition for correction in order to to effect the changes sought by Ohoma, he nevertheless failed to sufficiently establish that his father’s last name was “Ohomna”, and not “Ohoma”, through competent evidence.Nevertheless, while there is no need to re-file a petition for correction in order to to effect the changes sought by Ohoma, the Court finds that Ohoma failed to sufficiently establish that his father’s last name was “Ohomna”, and not “Ohoma”, through competent evidence. Thus, the correction of this entry in his birth certificate must be denied, as the last name to which a child is entitled is fixed by law, and the real name of a person is that given him in the Civil Register, not the name by which he was baptized in his Church or by which he was known in the community, or which he has adopted. DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

AGAPITO FUELLAS, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-14409

 AGAPITO FUELLAS, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-14409 October 31, 1961

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )

FACTS:

Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico, but the latter instead held the former by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground. 

Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment and the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting. As a result, a civil case for damages was filed against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico.

ISSUE:

Wherher Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.

HELD:

YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. This civil liability of the father or the mother, as the case may be, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them and the only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused”.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 115460

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING G.R. No. 115460 March 15, 1995

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)

FACTS: 

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City.  Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later.  Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer.  Reynaldo and Teresita began to maintain a common-law relationship of husband and wife where a child was born, Rosalind Therese.  During their vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the time they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince was born.  The relationship soon deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to California.  Because his assignment is not yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the Philippines.

Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show that the child experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S. to live with her mother.  She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother kissing a “bad” man who worked for her father.  Both children are now over seven years of age and prefer to stay with their father and aunt.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.

RULING:

NO, as both children are now over seven years of age, their choice of parent should be given respect by the court.

The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated from the mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case anymore.  As the children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the court should give due respect to their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the Philippines.  Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations from one man to another is considered by the court as a compelling reason not to award the children’s custody to her, for said behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child.  From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family Code.

AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448

 AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448 January 11, 2018

Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. (269a)

FACTS: 

AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. In May 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef. AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their CCC, and physical and sexual violence. The motion to quash was granted on ground of lack of jurisdiction (acts complained of had occurred in Singapore), and the case was archived.

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused with Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the affair takes place.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE PETITION FILED BY AAA INSTEAD OF THE OSG AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE ON PURE QUESTION OF LAW

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE UNDER R.A. 9262 WHEN COMMITTED THROUGH MARITAL INFIDELITY AND THE ALLEGED ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES

RULING:

1. AAA’s motion for extension to file the petition was timely filed. Thus, considering its timeliness, she was granted an additional period to file a petition for review. In her motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG’s response to her Letter, requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court.

2. The Court found that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the petition if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al., where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG’s participation, the Court allowed it in the interest of substantial justice.

ESALYN CHAVEZ v. HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, G.R. No. 109808

 G.R. No. 109808 March 1, 1995

ESALYN CHAVEZ v. HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, 

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be  proved by: 

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

FACTS: 

Esalyn Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation to perform in Japan for 6 months. The contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. After the approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her salary with her Japanese employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion). The salary was reduced to $500 and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In February 1991 (two years after the expiration of her contract), Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for underpayment of wages before the POEA.

The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by Chavez with her Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no knowledge of such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for sleeping on her right for two years. Chavez elevated the issue to the National Labor Relations Commission but the latter, chaired by Edna Bonto-Perez, affirmed the POEA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.

RULING:

Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez to authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:

It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void;

The side agreement which reduced Chavez’s basic wage is void for violating the POEA’s minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Here, both Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.

Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code.  For this reason, laches did not set in.

Gono-Javier vs. CA- - Marianne Aquino G.R. No. 111994

 Gono-Javier vs. CA- Marianne Aquino G.R. No. 111994 December 29, 1994

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be 

proved by: 

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

FACTS: 

The petitioners are Gono's deceased children. Five land plots right granted by their paternal grandfather Casocot following his passing in 1964 are allegedly theirs. The nephews and nieces of the late Casocot are against them. Gono was the natural child of Casocot and his common-lawspouse, but the petitioners claimed that Casocot recognized Catalino as their biological child on the basis of a statement in a deed of donation of one of the disputed lands in favor of Gonzales, Gono's widow, to the effect that one of the reasons for the donation was that the donee is the surviving spouse of my son with my common-law wife. The donation was given in 1954, which was roughly 11 years after Gono's passing.

ISSUE: 

Whether petitioners are entitled by intestate succession to the lands left by their natural grandfather in lieu of the alleged "acknowledgment" through the donation?

RULING:

No. Since this case came about in 1954, the New Civil Code was applicable.

Under Art. 278 of the NCC: " Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing."

In the case at bar, the statement made in the deed of donation, a public document, is considered as a valid recognition by virtue of the doctrine of incidental recognition. Unfortunately, the recognition was too late as this was made after the death of Catalino.

Sayson v. CA GR 892224-25

 Sayson v. CA GR 892224-25, January 23, 1992

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. 
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)

FACTS:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabel. Upon the death of Teodoro and Isabela, their properties were in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children. The plaintiffs filed for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabela. It was opposed by of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel alleging their successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants. Subsequently, of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for partition of intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are titled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of representation because of Delia and Edmundo are adopted children and of Doribel was legitimate daughter.

The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from E and R by right of representation. The CA found De and E disqualified from inheriting from E and R.

ISSUE:

Whether or not of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation

RULING:

As to Doribel, YES, for she was a legitimate daughter of T and thus granddaughter of E and R. She has right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of intestate estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.

As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers, cannot inherit by representation. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relative of either party.

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. vs. MARIANO PINEDA G.R. No. L-7231. March 28, 1956

 BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. vs. MARIANO PINEDA G.R. No. L-7231. March 28, 1956

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. 
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. 
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) 

FACTS:

Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (hereafter termed "Benguet" for short), was organized on June 24,1903, as a sociedad anonima regulated by Articles 151 et seq., of the Spanish Code of commerce of 1886, then in force in the Philippines. The articles ot association expressly provided that it was organized for a term of fifty (50) years. in 1906, the governing Philippine commission enacted Act 1459, commonly known as the Corporation Law, establishing in the islands the American type of juridical entities known as corporation, to take effect on April 1, 1906.

As the expiration of its original 50 year term of existence approached, the Board of Directors of Benguet adopted in 1946 a resolution to extend its life for another 50 years from July 3, 1946 and submitted it for registration to the Respondent securities and Exchange commissioner.

Relying mainly upon the adverse opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 180, s. 1953), the Securities and Exchange Commissioner denied the registration and ruled:

(1) That the Benguet, as sociedad anonima, had no right to extend the original term of corporate existence stated in its Articles of Association, by subsequent amendment thereof adopted after enactment of the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459);

(2) That Benguet, by its conduct, had chosen to continue as sociedad anonima, under section 75 of Act No. 1459, and could no longer exercise the option to reform into a corporation, especially since it would indirectly produce the effect of extending its life.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Benguet could still exercise the option of reforming and reorganizing under section 75 of the Corporation Law, thereby prolonging its corporate existence, since the law is silent as to the time when such option may be exercised or availed of.

RULING:

Under Section 75 of the Corporation law 1953, by continuing to do business as sociedad anonima, Benguet in fact rejected the alternative to reform as a corporation under Act No. 1459. It will be noted from the text of section 75 that no special act or manifestation is required by the law from the existing sociedades anonimas that prefer to remain and continue as such. It is when they choose to reform and organize under the Corporation Law that they must. in the words of the section. transfer all corporate interests to the new corporation". Hence if they do not so transfer, the sociedades anonimas affected are to be understood to have elected the alternative "to continue business as such corporation."

Furthermore, the court held that a sociedad anonima, existing before the Corporation Law, that continues to do business as such for a reasonable time after its enactments, is deemed to have made its election and may not subsequently claim to retorm into a corporation under section 75 of Act No. 1459.

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, Vs COURTOF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ, Respondents

 Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, vs COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ,

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)

FACTS:

Spouse Gilda ( private respondent) and Judie Corpuz are legally married. During their marriage they bought a 421 sq. meter lot located at Brgy. Gen. Paulino Santos, Koronadal South Cotabato Which became their conjugal dwelling. They sold one half of the lot to spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang (petitioners).Sometime in March 1990, Gilda went to Manila to find a job in the Middle-East. Being a victim of an illegal recruitment, stayed for some time in manila. In his absence, her husband planned to sell the remaining half of their lot to the Guiang spouses without her consent. Learning of her father’s plans, Harriet, one of her daughters, wrote a letter to Gilda informing the plans of their father. Gilda went home to Cotabato and there she discovered that some of her children are not living in their conjugal dwelling and her husband was nowhere to be found. She then decided to gather her children and stay in their conjugal dwelling where she realized that was already sold by her husband to spouses Guiang. The latter filed a case of trespassing to her before the Barangay Authorities. Then spouses Guiang executed an “amicable settlement” to ratify the deed of transfer of rights regarding the property Gilda filed a case in the RTC declaring the deed of transfer of rights involving the conjugal property of her and her husband null and void for it was executed without her consent. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Gilda declaring the deed of rights and the execution of amicable settlement null and void and of no effect.

Respondents appealed in the CA. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence the petition.

 

ISSUES:

1. Whether the assailed deed of transfer of rights was a void or a voidable contract

RULING:

1. The Guiang spouses allege that absence of Gilda’s consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties… The error in petitioners’ contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2 refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i .e contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

In re Estate of the deceased Andres Reyes vs Juana Reyes de Ilano GR No L-42092: October 1938

 In re Estate of the deceased Andres Reyes vs Juana Reyes de Ilano GR No L-42092: October 1938 

Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. (147a)

FACTS:

Andres Reyes and Luciana Farlin were married in the year 1893, having had six children, three of whom died without heirs before their parents' death, and two died also without heirs after the death of their mother Luciana Farlin, leaving the herein oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano as their only surviving child. About said year 1893, the parents of Andres Reyes leased certain parcels of land from the Spanish government. Upon their death during the Spanish regime, their son Andres Reyes succeeded them in said lease and the latter afterwards purchased said leased lands as friar lands from the Insular Government in the years 1909, 1910 and 1921. On October 1, 1910, Luciana Farlin also acquired by purchase from the Insular Government certain parcels of friar land described in certificates of sale. 

After the death of Luciana Farlin on November 12, 1922, her surviving spouse, Andres Reyes, contracted a second marriage with the herein applicant-appellant Felisa Camia. A son named Bibiano Reyes was born of said second marriage. During her marriage to Andres Reyes, Felisa Camia also purchased a parcel of friar land from the Government on June 3, 1930, and another on August 2, 1927, from her husband Andres Reyes, who had, acquired it on May 16, 1927, by purchase from the Insular Government. 

Andres Reyes died on April 20, 1932, leaving a will which was duly probated on June 21, 1933. He was survived by his wife, the herein executrix and appellant Felisa Camia, his only son had with her, named Bibiano Reyes, and his daughter by his first marriage, the herein oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano. Felisa Camia qualified on June 25, 1932, as executrix of the estate left by the deceased husband Andres Reyes. 

Severo Abellara and Luis Gaerlan were appointed commissioners on claims and appraisal. The herein appellant Felisa Camia filed her first and second account, as administratrix. The appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano filed her opposition to this account on both accounts, claiming that some of the items of expenses stated therein are unnecessary and inaccurate. 

The executrix-appellant Felisa Camia de Reyes then filed a project of partition, which was also opposed by the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano, alleging, among other things, that the valuation of the properties made by the commissioners on claims and appraisal is inadequate and unjust; that said project does not contain all the properties that should be partitioned; that it contains properties belonging to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage; and that said project is based upon the will, some of the provisions of which are inofficious and illegal; at the same time submitting a counterproject of partition with an appraisal of the properties therein enumerated, which appraisal is different from that made by the commissioners on claims and appraisal. This counterproject of partition presented by the oppositor-appellee is the one admitted and approved by the court. 

ISSUE:

Did the court erred in rejecting the project of partition of the executrix Felisa Camia and approving the counterproject presented by the heiress Juana Reyes de Ilano? 

RULING:

No. There is nothing in the law imposing upon the executor or administrator the obligation to present a project of partition for the distribution of the estate of a deceased person. Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to assign "... the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled .. ." (See also article 1052, Civil Code.) It is referred from these legal provisions that it is the Court of First Instance of Cavite alone that may make the distribution of his estate and determine the persons entitled, and it may require the executrix to present a project of partition to better inform itself of the condition of the estate to be distributed and so facilitate the prompt distribution thereof. The project of partition that the executor or administrator might have presented would not be conclusive and the interested parties could oppose the approval thereof and enter their counterproject of partition which the court might accept and approve, as it did in this case. In adopting the project of partition of the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano, said court acted within its discretionary power and committed no error of law. 

UY v. CAG.R. No. 102726

 UY v. CAG.R. No. 102726

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the decision, dated Sept.23, 1991, which reversed the order of RTC, Makati.

Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter.

FACTS:

Private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy was the common-law wife of the late Menilo B. Uy. The union bore four children, Melito, Nilda, Melvin and Merlito .On October 31, 1990, after the death of Menilo Uy, petitioners Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy petitioned before the RTC of Makati the administration of the estate of Menilo Uy.On February 28, 1991, private respondent filed a motion to hold the special proceedings; this is after she had filed a civil case for the “Partition of Properties Under Co-ownership”, against the estate of Menilo Uy. On the day of the trial, the parties submitted a Compromise Agreement. On May 15, 1991, a writ of execution was issued. On May 24, 1991, petitioner Tshiate Uy filed an omnibus motion, alleging that she was the surviving spouse of Menilo Uy, by virtue of their Hong Kong marriage. On June 10, 1991, the trial court allowed the intervention of Tshiate and set aside the “compromise judgment”. The trial court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent. So, she filed a petition for certiorari with the respondent court (CA). A decision was made by the appellate court on September 23, 1991:WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the orders of respondent court dated June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991 are hereby SET ASIDE. No costs. A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the private respondent has the right over the estate of Menilo B. Uy.

2. Whether or not the intervention was submitted in due time, as provided in Section 2, Rule 12, of the Revised Rules of the Court.

RULING:

1. The governing provisions found in Article 147 and 148 of the Family Code are applicable to the case at bar. Article 147.

“…without the benefit of marriage or under avoid marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.”  Article 148.“ 

In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit.

2. Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Court provides: Sec. 2.

Intervention— A person may, before or during atrial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, this Court held: In this case, the motion for intervention was filed after the trial has already been concluded and a judgment has been already promulgated. As stated in the case, motions“ are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under the aforesaid Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.” However, it is further provided in the case that “Rule 12 of Rules of the Court is simply a rule of procedure.” 

“The purpose of the procedure is not to thwart justice.” 

The denial of the motion for intervention from the strict implementation of the Rule due to lack of notice, or alleged failure, will lead the court to commit an injustice and open its doors to fraud, falsehood, and misinterpretation, should the intervenor’s claims be proven to be true.

The trial court itself, in setting aside its previous judgment upon compromise, has expressed "that the intervenors have legal interest in the matter in litigation," a statement which we find hard to brush aside. Private respondents argue that their failure to implead petitioners in the complaint for partition has been cured by the filing of petitioners' omnibus motion asking leave to intervene and attaching thereto an answer in intervention. Private respondents overlook the fact that the motion has been filed subsequent to the judgment based upon the compromise agreement (among private respondents themselves) that did not include, and thereby cannot be held to bind, petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and a new one is entered REINSTATING the order, dated10 June 1991, of the trial court.SO ORDERED.

LERMA VS Court of Appeals

 FACTS:

Husband Teodoro Lerma sued his wife and a certain Teddy Ramirez for adultery. Sometime later, the wife sued Lerma for legal separation with an urgent motion for support pendente lite. Lerma opposed the motion setting up the wife's alleged adultery as a defense.

ISSUE: 

Is the adultery a valid defense?

Held:

Yes. The alleged adultery adultery of the wife is a valid defense if there is a good chance that this adultery can be proved. And this is true, whether what is asked is support from the husband’s capital or from the conjugal partnership property, because even in the latter case where conjugal partnership assets are involved, the right to a separate maintenance is granted only if there is justifiable cause for it, not when the person asking is, to all appearance, guilty of adultery.

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:

(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;

(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;

(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;

(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;

(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or

(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

 

FACTS:

Yolanda Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1991. In 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment but since then, he never communicated with Yolanda. After nine (9) years of waiting, she filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead which the RTC granted. The Republic of the Philippines appealed from the decision contending that Yolanda failed to prove earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus, failed to prove well-founded belief that he was already dead. Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death based under Art. 41, Family Code was a summary judicial proceedings in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. The CA granted the motion.

ISSUE: 

Is the dismissal of the appeal correct, considering that the Family Code provides for summary procedure?

HELD: 

Judgment declaring a spouse presumptively dead is immediately final and executory; remedy is Rule 65, not Rule 45. The RTC decision is immediately final and executory and not subject to ordinary appeal.

Since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. The appropriate remedy is a special civil action for certiorari if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Imelda Pilapil v. Hon. Corona Somera, et.al., G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

 Imelda Pilapil v. Hon. Corona Somera, et.al., G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989 

FACTS 

In 1979 a Filipino married a German national named Erich Geiling. They live together as husband and wife, but later on separated. 3 1/2 years later., the husband found the petition for divorce in Germany, which was granted. In 1986 he filed the complaints for adultery against the Filipina, because of an affair with a man named William in 1982 and James in 1983.

The case was filed in court, but a motion to quash was filed, but which was denied. Hence a petition was filed in the supreme court, contending that the complainant cannot be qualified as an offender party, since he has already obtained a final divorce under his national law prior to the filing of the case. 

ISSUE

Whether or not Geiling is qualified to file the case

RULING: 

No. The supreme court said the crime of adultery, as well as the other crimes against chastity, will be prosecuted, except upon a sworn written complaint filed, but the offended spouse, compliance with this rule is jurisdictional. In prosecution for adultery and concubinage. The person who can legally file a complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. It is significant that while the state as parens patriae was added in the 1985 rules of criminal procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for the deceased or incapacitated victim. Such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery in concubinage. Only the offended spouse and no other is authorized by law to initiate the action.

It should be noted that the initiator must have the status capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence, the action be definitively established. 

The complainant must be the offended spouse and This is means that the complainant is still married to the accused. since they are already divorce He has no more capacity to file such action because the said divorced, and it’s effects are recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.

The private responded obtained, a valid divorce in his country. The federal republic of Germany said divorce, and it’s legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines, in so far as the private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle.

Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law